At the close of the previous note' I said without proof that (1 -pI -qN)/ (N -1) was the mean of P for the (m + 1) (n + 1) Yates spread of possible 2 X 2 tables arising in the controlled experiment with p as the common probability of cases and controls. This result is a corollary of the proof2 that the second moment of x = (ad -bc)/N in the Fisher-Yates series of 2 X 2 tables with constant margins
As the variance of V is the same for each diagonal in the Yates spread, except the two single terms m,O: O,n and O,m :n,O of probabilities p'f and qN in the corners for which there is no variance, the mean of P2 over the whole spread must be as stated. The result stated for the observed association, found by combining the results for the different possible spreads, was an immediate consequence.3
For the general case where it is not assumed that the probabilities of cases and controls are the same or that the probabilities back of the association are uncorrelated, one has to resort to the variational method used for large numbers.
Yule gave the result for association,4 remarking that the algebra was tedious, and Kendall (12) took the remark and result over. The lengthy algebra is due to the form into which the variance of V was thrown as a cubic in V. Another form is very easily obtained by noting that V is homogeneous of degree zero in the four letters a, b, c, d so that the sum Ea(OV/ba) over the letters must vanish. For association the mean of 6a2 is a -a2/N, the mean of 5abb is -ab/N, etc., and the mean of 5V2 is therefore Ea(1V/ba)2. The derivatives may be put in either of two forms; thus, with w = ad-bc,
The first form makes the variance of V explicitly a quadratic function of w, the If one would obtain Var V for the comparative experiment, he has 5a = -5b, Sd = -Sc with mean 5a2 as ab/m, Sd2 as cd/n, and Sald vanishing because of the fixed marginal totals m and n. Hence,
The interesting thing about this is that Var V is different according as one considers m,n or u,v as fixed unless a = d or b = c, and ordinarily both are different from the value for the association.6 When one examines the process by which one obtains the chi-square test appropriate to a cellular display as in Kendall's chapter 12, one sees it so full of assumptions individually true only for large numbers that one can only wonder that the test gives as good a prediction as it does. The process starts from the multinomial probability appropriate to the series of cells with known probabilities subject only to their sum being unity and none of them vanishing. It is well known that if the probabilities were really known, the degrees of freedom (the mean value of chisquare for all possible ways of filling the display) would be the number of cells less 1, namely, 1 for the binomial, 2 for the controlled experiment, 3 for association. The proof that in the use of chi-square the number of degrees of freedom is 1 in all three cases is given after the normal form has been shown for the cases where all the numbers in the cells are large.6
The Fisher-Yates series accomplishes this reduction at the start. It has only one degree of freedom. This can be regarded as a different approach to a theory of probability or as the basis for a particular definition of significance; but to me it has always seemed to introduce a definiteness greater than exists in science, especially science requiring the use of statistics, though, of course, no greater than exists in pure mathematics. For when one turns to science one finds observations which are afflicted with errors both random and systematic so that strictly mathematical laws are inevitably abstractions which exceed in precision their observational basis. Science is necessarily approximate, pragmatic, provisional upon subsequent findings and upon agreement between scientists, not absolute but within mutually recognized, even if not stated, limits of accuracy.7
It seems therefore that one must distinguish critically between probability as a purely mathematical subject of one sort or another and statistics which cannot be so regarded. I would define a probable inference as a necessary logical deduction from some theory of probability imposed upon the data under discussion. In contrast, a statistical inference would be one made from a plurality of samples with due allowance for errors both accidental and systematic. For a probable inference one may freely talk of errors of the first and second kinds, but for a statistical inference I should say that, lacking a definite probability theory and thus having no definite universe of discourse, errors of the second kind were not calculable and errors of the first kind were really some sort of skeptical reliance on the concordance in the samples one had in hand and a somewhat hopeful belief that future samples would not differ too widely from them. 'These PROCEEDINGS, 51, 288-293 (1964) . As for notations those of this reference will be followedwithm = a +b,n = c +d,u = a +c,v = b + d, x = pq, y = rs.
